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The struggle for the control of the internet and control of its content
continues apace. Governments and rights holders seek new strategies
and methods to bring a semblance of the control they have in the real
world to the digital environment. How does one regulate what,
supposedly, cannot be regulated?
It is clear that an individual is responsible for content they post on the
internet, whether it is material infringing intellectual property rights
on a peer-to-peer file-sharing system or on a website, or it is other
illegal material such as child pornography and defamatory material. In
some states with a less tolerant approach to individual freedoms this
approach can extend to material critical of a government or its
policies.
This article intends to focus, in particular, on the current debate
concerning control over intellectual property infringement using peer-
to-peer technologies via controlling internet service providers (ISPs).
There is a single fundamental problem with a strategy of pursuit of
the individual user. However, there are so many of them that,
especially, in areas such as intellectual property, enforcement
prosecutions in the civil courts can only ever act as a deterrent and
warning to other users. There is some evidence' that prosecutions
have some effect, but not nearly as much as the rights holders would
like, and this evidence is by no means unchallenged - for example,
the Gowers Report notes (at paragraph 5.93) that peer-to-peer usage
has still doubled in size since litigation commenced against users of it
I http://news.bbc.co.uk! 1/hi/entertainment/46273 68.stm.
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in 2003.2 The problems continue to be the difficulty of detection of
wrongdoers, the confirmation of the identity of the person actually at
the keyboard where, eg a PC is shared physically, or a single internet
address is used by several PC's connected to the internet via a router
using Network Address Translation (NAT), and jurisdictional
problems related to legal proceedings outside the rights holder's own
countries.
The explosion in the use of broadband internet has exacerbated the
problem.3 In the past downloading, for example, a DivX illegal copy
of a film would have taken many hours or even days over a dial up
internet connection. With a broadband connection this is reduced to
just hours. With a broadband connection a single illegal mp3 digital
music file takes just seconds, and an entire music album just minutes.
A new strategy has, therefore, been forming over the past few years.
If it is difficult or impossible to regulate millions of internet users, it
should be theoretically easier to regulate a smaller group, upon which
the millions depend - their internet service providers (ISP).
There is no one clear definition of what an ISP actually is, but Tiberi
and Zamboni4 adopt a most worthwhile categorisation of the essence
of what an ISP does and the legal liabilities that can arise thereunder.
ISP activities typically revolve around at least one but usually a
combination of:
• network operations, the hardware facilities that are needed for
the transmission of data;
• provision of access, providing users with access to the internet
and email accounts;
• provision of hosting services, rental of, eg web space;
2 Gowers Review of Intellectual Property 2006, p103, accessed at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/6/E/pbr06_gowersJeport_755.pdf.
3 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=8.
4 L Tiberi and M Zamboni, 'Liability of Service Providers', 2003 CTLR 49.
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• operation of bulletin boards, newsgroups and chatrooms being
typical examples;
• information location tool provider, provision of tools assisting in
locating information on the internet;
• content provider, providing actual online content, whether it be
news, images music files software or any other digital content.
In the UK and other member states of the EU, governments have been
pressing ISPs to prevent peer-to-peer file-sharing and other
potentially illegal activities. In the UK's 2006 Gowers Report
recommendation 39 stated:
Observe the industry agreement of protocols for sharing
data between ISPs and rights holders to remove and disbar
users engaged in 'piracy'. If this has not proved
operationally successful by the end of 2007, Government
should consider whether to legislate.5
UK government officials have made it clear they will legislate on the
matter if voluntary measures are not implemented.6 It is the purpose
of this work to examine the current legal and technical situation to see
if these threats are either justified or workable from the perspective of
a European Union ISP.
Internet Service Provider Liability
Overview
This is a complex topic involving potential liability of several fronts,
including, perhaps most commonly, defamation and liability for
intellectual property infringements - chiefly copyright. Overarching
all the potential liabilities is European Union Law, specifically, the
Electronic Commerce Directive.? The parts of this Directive of
5 Ibid, note 2 above.
6 http://news.bbc.co.ukll/hi/technology/7059881.stm.
7 Directive 2001/31.
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particular relevance in this context are Articles 12-14.8 To summarise
these provisions - an ISP is not liable where they are a 'mere conduit'
of information9 or where they are merely caching information lO or
where they are hosting information and have no knowledge of
anything illegal, and when they have such knowledge but act quickly
and expeditiously to remove it. II This has led many in the ISP
industry to simply disavow responsibility for infrin~ements taking
place, using their systems, as they are 'mere conduits'. 2 However, the
matter is complicated by Articles 12(3), 13(2) and 14(3) of the
Directive, which provide traditional remedies to prevent or stop
infringements of rights. 13
Article 14(3) also provides: 'This Article shall not ... affect the
possibility for Member States of establishing procedures governmg
the removal or disabling of access to information.'
Where there is material which is deemed to be 'cached' or 'hosted' by
an ISP, liability may also arise on receipt of actual knowledge of an
infringement, followed by inactivity on the part of the ISP.
8 These Articles are implemented in UK law by the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive)
Regulations 2002/2013; Regulations 17-19 correspond to Articles 12-14.
9 See discussion directly below on Article 12.
10 See discussion below on Article 13.
I J See discussion below on Article 14.
12 See note 4 above.
I] typically in an English court injunctive relief.
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Recent Developments
A Duty for ISP's to Control their Networks?
SABAM v Tiscali (Scarlet/ 4
The Belgian authors collecting society initiated legal proceedings
against Tiscali internet (who later became known as Scarlet) for
failure to control their internet traffic - specifically, in this instance,
for failing to control peer-to-peer downloading and uploading.
Traditionally, ISPs have argued that, as they are 'mere conduits' of
internet traffic, they are not liable for their user's activities. This is
based on the provision in Article 12 of Directive 2000/31. The
Brussels Court of First Instance considered the relationship between
various provisions of the E-Commerce Directive and its
implementation in Belgian law. As these are for the most part national
implementations of pan-ED measures, the case is of considerable
interest to those from any EU member state.
Article 12
'Mere conduit'
1. Where an information society service is provided that
consists of the transmission in a communication network
of information provided by a recipient of the service, or
the provision of access to a communication network,
Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not
liable for the information transmitted, on condition that
the provider:
(a) does not initiate the transmission;
(b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and
14 June 29, 2007 (so far unreported).
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(c) does not select or modify the information contained in
the transmission.
2. The acts of transmission and of provision of access
referred to in paragraph I include the automatic,
intermediate and transient storage of the information
transmitted in so far as this takes place for the sole purpose
of carrying out the transmission in the communication
network, and provided that the information is not stored
for any period longer than is reasonably necessary for the
transmission.
3. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or
administrative authority, in accordance with Member
States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to
terminate or prevent an infringement.
Note in this context paragraph 3 of Article 12 - the mere conduit
defence does not confer absolute protection. This paragraph would
appear to suggest that ISPs remain under some form of duty of care,
as suggested, inter alia, by Tiberi and Zamboni,15 possibly under
individual national laws. This matter is further explained by the
various recitals to the Directive, in particular, recitals 42 - 48:
(42) The exemptions from liability established in this
Directive cover only cases where the activity of the
information society service provider is limited to the
technical process of operating and giving access to a
communication network over which information made
available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily
stored, for the sole purpose of making the transmission
more efficient; this activity is of a mere technical,
automatic and passive nature, which implies that the
information society service provider has neither
knowledge of nor control over the information which is
transmitted or stored. (author's emphasis)
15 Above, note 4 (at page 51).
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What is interesting, and potentially worrying, from an ISP's
perspective about this recital's explanation is the following: If,
through technological processes, it becomes possible or it is already
possible to have both knowledge and control over the information
transmitted across its systems, do the mere conduit and caching
exemptions still apply? Is this why the expert's report on possible
controls to peer-to-peer file-sharing in the SABAM case seemed quite
crucial to the decision?
Article 15 of the Directive provides -
Article 15
No general obligation to monitor
1. Member States shall not impose a general obligation on
providers, when providing the services covered by Articles
12, 13 and 14, to monitor the information which they
transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek
facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.
2. Member States may establish obligations for
information society service providers promptly to inform
the competent public authorities of alleged illegal activities
undertaken or information provided by recipients of their
service or obligations to communicate to the competent
authorities, at their request, information enabling the
identification of recipients of their service with whom they
have storage agreements.
This is further explained by recital 47 and 48:
(47) Member States are prevented from imposing a
monitoring obligation on service providers only with
respect to obligations of a general nature; this does not
concern monitoring obligations in a specific case and, in
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particular, does not affect orders by national authorities in
accordance with national legislation. (authors emphasis)
(48) This Directive does not affect the possibility for
Member States of requiring service providers, who host
information provided by recipients of their service, to
apply duties of care, which can reasonably be expected
from them and which are specified by national law, in
order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal
activities. (author's emphasis)
Article 15, supported by recitals 47 and 48, states that there is no
general duty to monitor internet traffic; indeed, member states are
prevented from imposing such a duty. Could it be argued, however,
that something such as peer-to-peer traffic represents a specific case
in the terms of recital 47 or a certain type of illegal activity, as
mentioned in the recital? It does seem clear these are specifically
matters for national law.
Taking all these provisions together, it seems that the Court of First
Instance of Brussels felt that Tiscali/Scarlet were under a duty to
control the traffic on their network in a more forthright manner than
had previously been the case. Reading Recital 42 of the Directive, it
would appear the 'mere conduit' defence may not apply where an ISP
is able to control the traffic on their system, or a general duty of care
in national law was involved. It is trite to say, however, that a court
can only order an ISP to do what is technically possible. A key factor
in this case appears to have been the production for the court of a
report by an expert setting out what control options were possible for
the defendant. 16 A number of technical solutions to peer-to-peer
traffic have become available in recent years, produced by companies
such as Audiblemagic17 Sandvine l8 and Safemedia,19 among others.
16 The SABAM press release, http://www.sabam.be/website/data/Communiques_de_pressel
SABAM_vs_TISCALI_engl.pdf.
17 http://www.audiblemagic.com/products-services/copysense/.
18 http://www.sandvine.com/soJutions/p2p~olicy_mngmt.asp.
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These solutions, installed in an ISP's premises, typically examine
packets of data for characteristics which have characteristics of illegal
traffic, incoming or outgoing to their networks, and block access to
them or severely restrict the bandwidth allocated to the traffic. They
are more or less completely automated and so require little direct
action from an ISP's staff. This, at least, is the theory.
It is submitted that, while these solutions may be effective with the
current standard peer-to-peer clients out there, if blocking becomes
standard practice among ISP's, owing to threatened or actual
litigation, it will not be long before new peer-to-peer clients come out,
which can circumvent these systems. These systems may, then, adapt
to the new clients and block them; then the clients adapt and become
unblockable and a potential1y endless circle develops of threat,
followed by counter-threat, followed by new threat, similar to that
which has been ongoing in the anti-virus market for several years.
Such peer-to-peer clients, able to bypass common monitoring and
preventative measures, are already out there. 20 Is it wise to legally
oblige an ISP to become involved in this technical/legal merry-go-
round, where one day's certain solution can be the fol1owing day's
legacy software/hardware? Are courts and the legal process in fact
equipped to deal with this extremely rapid-moving and complex
technical area?
This matter is further complicated by several factors, for which no
easy solutions have been put forward.
Firstly, increasingly, legitimate commercial concerns are using peer-
to-peer variants to distribute data. Blizzard Software, for example,
producers of the tremendously popular online role-playing game,
World of Warcrqft, use a BitTorrent (a common peer-to-peer client)
derivative to download updates to this extremely popular game. Both
Sky and the BBe also use peer-to-peer systems for their 'Sky
Anytime' and 'iPlayer' systems. The reasons for this are quite
19 http://www.safemediacorp.com/.
20 See, for example, ROD! a next generation peer-to-peer system at
http://rodi.sourceforge.net/abolltRodi.html.
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straightforward. Rather than have thousands of single users download
from, eg, Sky's content provider server, which would place
tremendous strain on the system with multiple requests, and occupy
significant bandwidth, it is easier to spread the load around a
distributed network of the companies' own servers and also from
other downloaders who have already, at least, partially downloaded
the content via peer-to-peer systems. By spreading the load across
several or several hundred different systems, it places significantly
less stress on the primary download server and the companies'
bandwidth. Kontiki, the peer-to-peer technology used by Sky, is such
an integral part of their system that removal of the software from a PC
will cause the Sky Anytime systems to cease to function on that PC.
Thus, the line between illegal and legal uses and users of certain
technologies is blurring, and this makes inspection and detection of
genuine infringements significantly more difficult.
Secondly, Deep Packet Inspection (DPl) is an increasing concern to
the internet community. Many of the next generation methods of
detecting illegal material on an ISP's network use these technologies.
Traditional packet inspection only 'scrapes the surface' of data
packets, crossing a network by looking at their 'headers', and is easily
bypassed or circumvented. DPl, by contrast, looks much further down
into the data layers of a packet of data on a network and can be used
to detect many forms of illegal activities. It can also be used to
prioritise certain forms of internet traffic over others, such as
favouring, for example, internet video which requires high bandwidth
over something like peer-to-peer, which is seen to be undesirable,
most traffic being illegal, and a high bandwidth consumer to boot.
Being a relatively new technology, the legality of DPI has yet to be
tested, and a full examination of the implications is outside the scope
of this work. However, potential future sources of conflict may arise
in relation to an individual's right to privacy under Article 8 of the
European Convention of Human Rights, as well as legislation
concerning data protection21 and interception of communications. For
21 Directive 2002/58 Article 5 Confidentiality of the communications.
I. Member States shall ... prohibit listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of interception or
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example, it would not seem legal for ISPs to intercept and examine
packets of data beyond a superficial level unless ordered to do so by
the correct authorities, as required by, for example, the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
Anonymity of Users
Another key issue for ISPs is the anonymity of their users. When an
individual uses the internet, their PC has an Internet Protocol (IP)
address, unique to that machine. This address is a series of numbers
such as 192.64.21. I, which identifies the computer. Every computer
connected to the Internet has such an address. ISPs typically allocate
their customers such addresses by one of two different methods -
either via a static IP address - that is, a single user or network keeps a
single address for use, or much more commonly, via dynamic IP
addressing - that is, the user is allocated an IP address from a pool of
available addresses each time they log in. Whichever method is used,
it is a user's IP address that is the identifier of the user and their
activities. Unfortunately, for rights holders a simple numeric address
tells them little of illegal activities or potential targets for litigation.
This address needs to be traced back to a specific internet service
provider, and then the provider needs to supply the actual details of
the user to the rights holders by matching the time and use of the
internet address with its database of customers and their personal
details. A number of companies specialise in this tracing process,
perhaps the most high-profile being SafeNet MediaSentry Inc.22
Perhaps, understandably, the ISPs have been reluctant to divulge the
details of their paying customers, thereby exposing them to
threatened or actual litigation. There are also issues concerning
human rights, in particular, the right to privacy, and data protection
rights, bound up in this question.
surveillance of communications and the related traffic data by persons other than users,
without the consent of the users concerned, except when legally authorised to do so in
accordance with Article 15( I).
22 http://www.mediasentry.com/index3 .html.
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A typical scenario would be - a user makes publicly available an mp3
music file via a peer-to-peer client, such as Kazaa or BitTorrent, for
other users to upload from their pc. This act of making available
constitutes an infringement of copyright throughout all ED member
states, owing to national implementations of Article 3 of Directive
2001/29 which states:
Article 3
Right of communication to the public of works and right
of making available to the public other subject-matter
1. Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive
right to authorise or prohibit any communication to the
public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including
the making available to the public of their works in such a
way that members of the public may access them from a
place and at a time individually chosen by them.
2. Member States shall provide for the exclusive right to
authorise or prohibit the making available to the public, by
wire or wireless means, in such a way that members of the
public may access them from a place and at a time
individually chosen by them:
(a) for performers, of fixations of their performances;
(b) for phonogram producers, of their phonograms;
(c) for the producers of the first fixations of films, of the
original and copies of their films;
(d) for broadcasting organisations, of fixations of their
broadcasts, whether these broadcasts are transmitted by
wire or over the air, including by cable or satellite.
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3. The rights referred to in paragraphs I and 2 shall not be
exhausted by any act of communication to the public or
making available to the public as set out in this Article.
The rights holders, therefore, need to obtain the personal details of the
alleged infringer from the ISP before they can pursue legal action
against the individual. This is actually a much used deterrent tactic by
rights holders, and some high-profile examples have been made of
users providing many files for upload off their system.
In the ECJ case, Productores de Musica de Espana Promusicae v
Telef6nica de Espana SAU23 the Advocate-General, Juliane Kokott,
the advisor to the European Court of Justice, who produces a usually
highly influential preliminary opinion on the legal issues involved in a
case, concluded that ISPs were not obliged to reveal personal data of
their clients in cases concerning civil litigation. This opinion, if
followed by an ECl ruling, could severely restrict the ability of
intellectual property rights holders, in particular, to track down
individuals who allow large-scale uploads off their systems.
This case concerned a typical dispute between an ISP and a rights
holder. The Spanish collecting society for music, Promusicae,
requested client details from the ISP Telefonica so that they may
enforce their members' rights against alleged infringers on
Telefonica's network. This request concerned users of the Kazaa
peer-to-peer client. Telefonica retained such data for a set period, and
Promusicae wanted it.
The Advocate-General's opinion looked at the relationship between a
number of different directives, but her primary focus was on Directive
2002/58.24 The Advocate-General stated this Directive derived from
23 C-275/06 ECl.
24 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002,
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), Official
Journal L 201,31/07/2002 P. 0037 - 0047.
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fundamental human rights, including, especially, the right to Privacy
and Family Life, enshrined in Art 8, ECHR.25
A fundament of Directive 2002/58 is Article 5(1):
Confidentiality of the Communications
1. Member States shall ensure the confidentiality of
communications and the related traffic data by means of a
public communications network and publicly available
electronic communications services, through national
legislation. In particular, they shall prohibit listening,
tapping, storage or other kinds of interception or
surveillance of communications and the related traffic data
by persons other than users, without the consent of the
users concerned, except when legally authorised to do so
in accordance with Article 15(1). This paragraph shall not
prevent technical storage which is necessary for the
conveyance of a communication without prejudice to the
principle of confidentiality.
This general principle is subject to exceptions, however, just as the
basic human right to privacy is subject to exceptions where they are
necessary in a democratic society and proportionate.26
Promusicae tried to argue that some of the exceptions, found in either
Article 6 or Article 15 of Directive 2002/58, might have applied. In
particular Article 15 (I) is relevant here:
Article 15
Application of certain provisions of Directive 95/46/EC
25 Paras 51-54.
26 Art 8(2).
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1. Member States may adopt legislative measures to
restrict the scope of the rights and obligations provided for
in Article 5, Article 6, Article 8(1), (2), (3) and (4), and
Article 9 of this Directive when such restriction constitutes
a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure
within a democratic society to safeguard national security
(i.e. State security), defence, public security, and the
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of
criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic
communication system, as referred to in Article 13(1) of
Directive 95/46/EC. To this end, Member States may, inter
alia, adopt legislative measures providing for the retention
of data for a limited period justified on the grounds laid
down in this paragraph. All the measures referred to in this
paragraph shall be in accordance with the general
principles of Community law, including those referred to
in Article 6(1) and (2) of the Treaty on European Union.
(authors emphasis)
The Advocate-General, however, rejected that any of the exceptions
in Article 6 or 15 applied to the general duty of confidentiality,
expressed in Article 5 (1) in the case of disclosure of customer or
traffic data by an ISP to a litigant or potential litigant.
This view, if followed by the ECl, has widespread implications for
intellectual property enforcement in the EU by rights holders against
peer-to-peer and other potential intellectual property infringers. In
future, enforced disclosure of such details might only be possible for
one of the purposes set out in Article 15 - which would typically be to
government agencies, or by order of the court. Matters relating to
national security, defence, public security, and the prevention,
investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of
unauthorised use of the electronic communication system relate to
essentially criminal matters, and not the civil lawsuit of copyright
infringement.
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Practical realities being what they are, most rights holders will not be
using a potentially expensive and complex procedure against
individuals where there is little realistic chance of getting the financial
outlay for such an action back from the defendant.
The Final decision of the European Court in Promusicae is much
anticipated and needed by the member states. There is much
confusion, evident in the decisions of national courts in several
member states attempting to reconcile several related directives on
areas such as intellectual property rights, their enforcement, and the
relationship between those directives and those on Data Protection??
This may be a double-edged sword, however, for ISPs. If rights
holders find it increasingly difficult to pursue more obvious infringers
using peer-to-peer or other web technologies, the focus may tum even
more towards the ISPs, and this may result in more, not less,
litigation.
To conclude, the focus of both government and intellectual property
rights holders are very firmly placed upon ISPs at this time. This is an
unenviable position for the ISPs to be in. The bodies representing the
rights holders and governments seem to regard asking ISPs to get
more involved in helping to prevent and punish intellectual property
theft as a key strategy in their plan - to quote Gower. There is a logic
to this, but any measures, eventually adopted, need to take account of
the considerable technical and legal complexity involved in any
solutions. Recent suggestions by the music industry to extend the
liability of ISPs28 are probably unworkable, not least because of the
UK's obligations under the various directives already discussed. The
Gower Report's suggestion to create a 'Best Common Practice'
(BCP) document, agreed between the ISP's and rights holders,
remains a good solution, and is being discussed at length at the time
27 See, for example, E Prosperetti, 'The Peppermint "Jam": peer-to-peer goes to court in
Italy', (2007) 18(8) En! LR, 280-283; D. Stols, 'Brein v KPN Telecom and the Dutch Civil
Code -ISPs under pressure', (2007) 18(4) En! LR 147-149.
28 Association of Independent Music (AIM), the MCPS-PRS alliance and the Musicians'
Union, joint release, issued on Julyl2, 2006 for a 'Value Recognition Right'.
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of writing (Autumn 2007). However, securing agreement for this is
not going to be easy with the current legal framework.
Rights holders want speedy discovery of the details of individual
infringers of their rights. However, an ISP that conforms with this
may well be risking alienating other customers of theirs, which in a
very competitive industry is most unwise. It may also leave itself
open to claims that it has breached privacy rights and rights associated
with data protection law of the user, whose details are given to rights
holders.
Rights holders may want infringing users to be cut off from the
Internet or have their accounts suspended. Again, this raises a
minefield of potential problems for the ISP. If an ISP suspends an
internet connection, increasingly, these days the ISP will not only be
suspending access to the internet but could be also suspending access
to voice over IP telephone services such as Skype, and also television
and many others. This could be illegal under Telecoms legislation and
may result in the involvement of OFCOM.
Rights holders may wish for illegal peer-to-peer traffic to be blocked
over an rsP's network. But, how do you distinguish the illegal uses
from increasing legal uses of the method? Even detecting the type of
traffic that is illegal may itself be of questionable legality if DPI is
used. Is an ISP legally permitted to look so deeply into traffic data of
users, which may reveal all sorts of things about that user (not just
that they are conducting an illegal peer-to-peer file-sharing, but
perhaps, also, their political interests, their sexual orientation, their
relationships or anyone of a number of other possibilities, which are
properly private, and considered sensitive data under data protection
legislation? To use an analogy, it is like expecting the post office to
open every piece of mail to check for correspondence relating to
illegal activities. DPI is an intentionally intrusive technology which
might be effective at controlling peer-to-peer technologies of today,
but for which encryption of the packets of data sent by any internet
application, including peer-to-peer clients, can effectively defeat it. If
DPr is in fact legal, expect the next big internet peer-to-peer client to
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find a way around it. Just as, when Napster was shut down, the
internet community looked to much more distributed models to
bypass the Napster ruling, and systems such as Kazaa and Edonkey
came about, so, the same is likely to happen with any effective
technical form of detection or control today. That control is only
likely to be temporary.
What is needed today is for the rights holders to continue to provide
low cost affordable and value-added services, related to music and
other copyright content. Considerable new profits are being made in
this area. They need to work together to come up with a common
standard for digital rights management solutions which allow them to
protect what they distribute and which do not inconvenience the users
of their products any more than a bare minimum, and they need to
continue to build a constructive relationship with internet service
providers. But, that solution needs to recognise the extremely difficult
position ISPs are in, given the current legal framework29 .
29 The author would like to thank Peter Milford, the Regulatory Affairs Manager of Newnet
pic for his generous input and advice on the technical aspects of this article.
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